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CARRYING THE SECOND AMENDMENT OUTSIDE 
OF THE HOME: A CRITIQUE OF THE THIRD 
CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN DRAKE V. FILKO 
Ryan Notarangelo+ 
“The great object is, that every man be armed. . . . Every one who is able may 
have a gun.”1  Today, some Americans might attribute these words to powerful 
pro-gun lobby organizations like the National Rifle Association (NRA).2  
However, Patrick Henry, a colonial statesman, revolutionary colonel, and the 
first governor of Virginia, said them over two centuries ago.3  Undoubtedly, 
events such as the horrific gun massacres in Aurora, Colorado and Newtown, 
Connecticut,4 the failed Manchin-Toomey Senate proposal on federal gun 
regulations,5 and the acquittal of George Zimmerman6 illustrate America’s 
 +  J.D. Candidate, May 2015, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.  The 
author is grateful to the Catholic University Law Review for their wonderful work preparing this 
paper for publication. 
 1. Patrick Henry, The Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia, on the 
Adoption of the Federal Constitution (June 2, 1788), in 3 The Debates in the Several State 
Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, as Recommended by the General 
Convention at Philadelphia, in 1787 386 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836). 
 2. See Brian Palmer, Why Is the NRA So Powerful? How the Gun Lobby Leverages Modest 
Resources into Outsized Influence, SLATE (Dec. 18, 2012, 3:33 PM), http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2012/06/eric_holder_charged_with_contempt_how_did_the
_nra_swing_the_votes_of_so_many_democrats_.html (discussing the NRA’s founding and 
influence in the United States). 
 3. STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 74 (2d ed. 1994). 
 4. See Keith Coffman, Colorado Wrestles with Gun Control One Year After Theater 
Shooting, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (July 20, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-07-
20/news/sns-rt-us-usa-denver-shooting-20130720_1_colorado-movie-theater-theater-shooting-
james-holmes (noting that Colorado passed stricter gun regulations after the Aurora shooting); see 
also 20 Children Among Dead in Connecticut School Massacre, CBC NEWS (Dec. 14, 2012, 10:58 
AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/20-children-among-dead-in-connecticut-school-massacre-
1.1134782 (reporting the massacre at Sandy Hook Elementary School, which left twenty children 
dead). 
 5. See Ted Barrett & Tom Cohen, Senate Rejects Expanded Gun Background Checks, CNN 
(Apr. 18, 2013, 11:02 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/17/politics/senate-guns-vote.  The 
Senate also reviewed a ban on assault weapons, but none of the regulations mustered enough 
political support on either side.  See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer, Party-Line Vote in Senate Panel for 
Ban on Assault Weapons, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.ny 
times.com/2013/03/15/us/politics/panel-approves-reinstatement-of-assault-weapons-
ban.html?ref=guncontrol&_r=1& (noting that, although an assault weapons ban was passed in 
committee, it was extremely unlikely to be passed by the whole Congress); see also, US Gun 
Debate: Guns in Number, BBC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2013, 2:09 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
us-canada-20759139 (listing President Obama’s wide-ranging gun control proposals). 
 6. Greg Botelho & Holly Yan, George Zimmerman Found Not Guilty of Murder in Trayvon 
Martin’s Death, CNN (July 14, 2013, 11:50 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/13/justice/ 
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continuous struggle for harmony between workable gun regulations and the 
preservation of gun rights.7  At the center of this emotionally charged 
controversy is the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
The Second Amendment provides that “[a] well regulated Militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear 
Arms, shall not be infringed.”8  In District of Columbia v. Heller,9 the Supreme 
Court of the United States attempted to clarify, in part, the meaning of the 
Second Amendment.10  Limited by the facts of Heller, the Court held that the 
zimmerman-trial/.  After Zimmerman’s trial and acquittal, some Americans pushed for a national 
debate on gun control, violence, and the Second Amendment with particular focus on stand-your-
ground laws.  The Editorial Board, Editorial, Lax Gun Laws vs. Trayvon Martin’s Life: Our View, 
USA TODAY (July 16, 2013, 8:33 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/07/ 
16/trayvon-martin-george-zimmerman-gun-laws-editorials-debates/2523159/ (arguing that stand-
your-ground laws and less stringent gun laws are the result of absurd gun lobbying).  Thousands 
rallied across the United States against such laws.  Tom Watkins, Nationwide Rallies Demand 
‘Justice for Trayvon’, CNN (July 20, 2013, 8:04 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/20/us/trayvon-
day/index.html. 
 7. See Jaime Fuller, It’s Been 20 Years Since the Brady Bill Passed. Here Are 11 Ways Gun 
Politics Have Changed, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
fix/wp/2014/02/28/its-been-20-years-since-the-brady-law-passed-how-have-gun-politics-
changed/ (noting that in 2013, forty-eight percent of Americans thought it was more important to 
protect gun rights than to regulate gun ownership); see also Taylor Kate Brown, What’s Behind 
Growing Gun Rights Support in the US?, BBC NEWS (Dec. 16, 2014, 5:42 PM), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-30485978 (finding that support for gun rights increased again 
in 2014 from 2013).  Even Starbucks steamed into the frothy gun debate: “The coffee chain 
Starbucks has asked its customers in the US to stop bringing guns into its outlets.”  See Starbucks 
Asks Customers Not to Bring Guns into Outlets, BBC NEWS (Sept. 18, 2013, 5:44 AM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-24142085; see also Chipotle Asks Customers Not to Bring 
Guns into Restaurants, BBC NEWS (May 20, 2014, 11:43 AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
us-canada-27492193 (resulting from an incident in Texas, where several customers brought assault-
like rifles into Chipotle restaurants). 
  Political discussions on the gun debate are sometimes career-ending, too.  During a recent 
recall election in Colorado, the president of the state senate was ousted after supporting stricter gun 
regulations. See Colorado Voters Sack Gun-Control Democrats, BBC NEWS (Sept. 11, 2013, 12:32 
PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-24055400. 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 9. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 10. Id. at 592 (stating the Second Amendment confers the right to carry a firearm for 
protection).  The confusion surrounded the right’s scope.  Two schools of interpretation, one 
supporting the individual right to bear arms and the other supporting the collective right, claimed 
to unlock the true meaning of the Second Amendment’s twenty-seven words.  See DAVID C. 
WILLIAMS, THE MYSTIC MEANINGS OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT: TAMING POLITICAL 
VIOLENCE IN A CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC 15 (2003); see also Margaret E. Sprunger, Comment, 
D.C. As a Breeding Ground for the Next Second Amendment Test Case: The Conflict Within the 
U.S. Attorney’s Office, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 577, 581–83 (2004) (discussing the two schools of 
Second Amendment interpretation). However, a third school viewed the Second Amendment as a 
civic duty rather than an individual or collective right. See, e.g., 1 GUN CONTROL AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: SOURCES AND EXPLORATIONS ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT xv (Robert Cottrol 
ed., 1993).  The individual rights school interpreted the Second Amendment as securing an 
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Second Amendment protected an individual’s right to keep and bear arms for 
self-defense inside the home.11  Two years later, in 2010, the Supreme Court 
further held that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated to the states the 
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for self-defense.12  After Heller, 
the Second Amendment unequivocally protects a right to bear arms for self-
defense inside the home.  However, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit stated: “[T]he Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question whether 
the Second Amendment creates a right of self-defense outside the home.”13 
According to Heller, the scope of the Second Amendment is determined by 
its historical origins and its plain language.14  The history of the right to bear 
arms originated within the context of the English Civil War and its aftermath.15  
Shortly after the English Civil War, the English Parliament secured the English 
Bill of Rights.16  In that charter, the Parliament stated that certain subjects of the 
Crown had the right to armed self-defense.17  However, in colonial America 
armed self-defense was more pressing a need than in England because Native 
Americans and other European countries threatened the colonists’ security.18 
Eventually, the notion of armed self-defense for protection from hostile 
Native Americans transitioned to armed self-preservation from a tyrannical 
individual right to bear and keep arms, while the collective right school read the Amendment to 
protect the right to bear and keep arms only for militia use.  WILLIAMS, supra, at 15–16. 
 11. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
 12. McDonald v. City of Chi., Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (“[W]e hold that the Second 
Amendment right is fully applicable to the States.”). 
 13. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Iyen Acosta, Note, Doe v. 
Wilmington Housing Authority: The Common Area Caveat as a Paradigmatic Balance Between 
Tenant Safety and Second Amendment Rights, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 1113, 1136 (2013) (discussing 
the courts’ reluctance to make a determination regarding extending Second Amendment rights 
outside the home, because the Supreme Court did not make that determination in Heller). 
 14. Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (noting that these two considerations decide the scope of the right 
to bear arms). 
 15. Id. at 591–95; see ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS: RIGHTS AND 
LIBERTIES UNDER THE LAW 13–14 (2001) (discussing the history of the right to bear arms); see 
also Ralph J. Rohner, The Right to Bear Arms: A Phenomenon of Constitutional History, 16 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 53, 58–59 (1967) (same). 
 16. Heller, 554 U.S. at 593; SPITZER, supra note 15, at 14 (stating that the English Bill of 
Rights was enacted as a reaction to James II’s rule). 
 17. Heller, 554 U.S. at 593–94; see also STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THE FOUNDERS’ SECOND 
AMENDMENT: ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 11 (2008) (“[T]he English Bill of Rights of 
1689, declared certain ‘true, ancient and indubitable rights,’ including: ‘That the Subjects which 
are Protestants, may have Arms for their Defence suitable to their Condition, and as are allowed by 
Law.’”); SPITZER, supra note 15, at 14–15 (stating that the English Bill of Rights law regarding the 
right to bear arms applied “only to nobility, wealthy landowners, and members of the militia 
executing their duty to defend the country”). 
 18. SPITZER, supra note 15, at 13 (acknowledging that the colonies faced a multitude of 
varying threats during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries). 
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government.19  The colonists were successful in the Revolutionary War because, 
in part, most owned private arms.20  After the Revolutionary War, Americans 
feared that the new federal government would take away their rights in the same 
manner as the previous government.21  The Framers, seeking to preserve 
individual rights, ratified the American Bill of Rights, thereby enshrining the 
right to bear and keep arms for self-defense.22 
Though preserved centuries ago, this right to keep and bear arms was not well 
understood in pre-Heller America.23  In fact, Heller elucidated the Second 
Amendment’s meaning and held that, at its core, the Second Amendment 
protected an individual’s right to keep and bear arms for the lawful purpose of 
self-defense.24  However, the Court did not explicitly comment on the scope of 
the Second Amendment outside of the home.25  Although lower federal courts 
have examined this particular aspect of the Second Amendment without clear 
guidance from the nation’s highest court, their opinions are scattered like 
birdshot on a silhouette target.26  Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit, in Drake v. Filko,27 considered the Second Amendment’s rights 
outside of the home and rebuffed a challenge to New Jersey’s “justifiable need” 
requirement for the issuance of a firearm carry permit.28  The court declined to 
decide whether the Second Amendment protected a right to bear arms outside 
the home.29  Instead, it simply assumed that the Second Amendment applied 
 19. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 594–95 (discussing the threats the colonists faced from the 
British); see also HALBROOK, supra note 17, at 13–14 (noting that, as Plato and Aristotle taught, 
“an armed populace means polity and direct democracy”). 
 20. See WARREN FREEDMAN, THE PRIVILEGE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE SECOND 
AMENDMENT AND ITS INTERPRETATION 44–45 (1989) (stating that colonial law required nearly all 
households to have firearms). 
 21. Heller, 554 U.S. at 594–95; HALBROOK, supra note 17, at 181 (asserting that some feared 
congressional control of the militia would turn the militia into a dangerous group). 
 22. Heller, 554 U.S. at 601–02; see also HALBROOK, supra note 17, at 305 (elucidating the 
Framers’ intent with regards to the Second Amendment). 
 23. See JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-
AMERICAN RIGHT ix (1994); see also infra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 24. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635; see also McDonald v. City of Chi., Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 
(2010) (noting the Court’s holding in Heller). 
 25. See, e.g., Kachalsky v. Cacace, 817 F. Supp. 2d 235, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (stating that 
Heller did not discuss the Second Amendment right outside of the home), aff’d sub nom. Kachalsky 
v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013). 
 26. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that the “amendment 
confers a right to bear arms for self-defense, which is as important outside the home as inside”); 
but see Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 430–31 (3d Cir. 2013) (assuming arguendo that the Second 
Amendment protects a right outside of the home, but upholding the gun restrictions based on 
means-end scrutiny), cert. denied sub nom. Drake v. Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014). 
 27. 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 28. Drake, 724 F.3d at 429–30 (concluding that the “justifiable need” requirement is a 
longstanding prohibition on Second Amendment protections and, thus, presumptively valid under 
the Second Amendment). 
 29. Id. at 440 (focusing on the regulations’ failure to burden Second Amendment rights). 
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outside of the home,30 and held that the requirement of a “justifiable need” to 
bear arms outside of the home did not violate the Second Amendment’s core 
protection of self-defense.31 
This Note discusses why Drake v. Filko is inconsistent with the Second 
Amendment as interpreted in Heller. Beginning with an analysis of the history 
and text of the Second Amendment, from its English roots to its meaning 
throughout both the Framers’ era and the post-ratification period, this Note then 
turns to the Supreme Court’s application of the Second Amendment in Heller 
and McDonald v. Chicago,32 noting the ramifications of each with regard to 
carrying firearms for the lawful purpose of self-defense outside of the home.33  
Next, this Note addresses the federal circuit courts’ varying approaches to the 
issue of whether the Second Amendment protects a right to carry a firearm for 
the lawful purpose of self-defense outside of the home, with a particular focus 
on the Drake decision.34  Finally, this Note proposes that Drake’s dissent, 
coupled with the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ 
decisions, is the proper interpretation of the Second Amendment’s protections.  
In light of the text and history of the Second Amendment and Supreme Court 
precedent, the Second Amendment protects a right to lawful armed self-defense, 
both inside and outside of the home. 
I.  THE ROOTS OF THE RIGHT: SEEDS SOWN BY ENGLISH HANDS BUT GROWN 
ON AMERICAN SOIL 
Throughout the twentieth century, the rights now guaranteed by the Second 
Amendment were a mystery—their dark grey shadow only seen through an 
 30. Id. at 431 (“Assuming that the Second Amendment individual right to bear arms does 
apply beyond the home . . . .”). 
 31. See id. at 440. 
 32. 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010). 
 33. This Note does not address the applicable level of  judicial scrutiny required when 
evaluating the Second Amendment.  Nor does it distinguish between concealed and openly-carried 
weapons, or address the various sensitive places where an individual may or may not carry a 
firearm.  Furthermore, it will not consider public policy arguments based on gun violence.  See 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (stating that public policy arguments are 
inappropriate in analyzing constitutional amendments).  Rather, the Note’s focus is only on the 
antecedent question: whether the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms has any application 
outside of the home for self-defense. 
 34. There are other areas outside the home in which the Second Amendment might afford its 
protections, such as hunting, sport shooting, and target practice.  See Eugene Volokh, Implementing 
the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self–Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research 
Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1448 (2009). 
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opaque window.35  Yet, this could not have always been the case.36  The English 
origins of the right to bear arms, its growth in colonial America, and the Framers’ 
conception of the Second Amendment all support the proposition that the 
Second Amendment protects a right to bear arms outside of the home for the 
lawful purpose of self-defense. 
A.  Carrying Firearms for the Lawful Purpose of Self-Defense Outside of the 
Home: A “True, Ancient, and Indubitable Right” 
The right to bear arms in England began not as a right, but rather as a duty to 
bear arms.37  During the English Civil War, in the seventeenth century, the duty 
to bears arms evolved into a right to be armed.38  In that war, citizens began to 
carry personal weapons for self-defense and armed resistance.39  As codified in 
the English Declaration of Rights in 1689, the right to bear arms for self-defense 
was not clearly confined to the walls of the home.40  Although English history 
is not dispositive when interpreting the protections of the Second Amendment, 
it provides, as Heller stated, the integral, foundational context that is necessary 
 35. See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011) (Wilkinson, J.) 
(noting that evaluating Second Amendment protections outside of the home is “a vast terra 
incognita”). 
 36. Heller noted “that the Bill of Rights codified venerable, widely understood liberties.” 
Heller, 554 U.S. at 605.  See HALBROOK, supra note 17, at 310–20 (stating that the Framers, who 
drafted, discussed, and ratified the Second Amendment, understood its purpose). 
 37. MALCOLM, supra note 23, at 1 (noting the right to bear arms in England grew from a prior 
obligation to be armed). 
 38. Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second 
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 214–15 (1983). 
 39. MALCOLM, supra note 23, at 31.  Under the rule of King Charles II, large groups of 
Protestant Englishman were disarmed by force.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 592–93; see also 
MALCOLM, supra note 23, at 75–76 (stating that Game Act of 1671 served as a means of arms 
control).  After the English Civil War, British Parliament recognized the dangers to its power 
associated with gun possession by commoners and did not want to allow the King Charles II, a 
Catholic, to disarm Protestants while arming Catholics.  ANDREW CARLSON, THE ANTIQUATED 
RIGHT: AN ARGUMENT FOR THE REPEAL OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 26–27 (2002) (noting that 
the Game Act of 1671 allowed landlords to disarm their mostly Catholic tenants).  Parliament, 
disapproving of James’ actions to arm Catholics, asked William of Orange to become king. Id. at 
27. 
 40. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 593.  In 1689, after the Glorious Revolution, recently enthroned 
William called a convention to address the rights of the English people and to secure the rights of 
his subjects against any future intrusions by a new king.  MALCOLM, supra note 23, at 113 
(expressing the concerns shared by Englishmen over another tyrannical rule).  The Convention 
promulgated a Declaration of Rights.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 593. 
  The Declaration of Rights enumerated the “true, ancient, and indubitable,” MALCOLM, 
supra note 23, at 115, rights and liberties of the English people, one of which provided: “That the 
Subjects which are Protestants, may have Arms for their Defence suitable to their Conditions, and 
as allowed by Law.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 593 (quoting 1 W. & M., ch. 2, § 7, in 3 Eng. Stat. at Large 
441) (internal quotation marks omitted).  This right protected an individual right to bear arms for 
self-defense, rather than a collective right to bear arms.  MALCOLM, supra note 23, at 119–20. 
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to understand the adoption and meaning of the Second Amendment.41  For more 
than one hundred years, this English right to bear arms developed in colonial 
America and evolved into a fundamental right for the young American 
country.42 
B.  Disarmed and Alarmed in Colonial America: Privately Possessing 
Firearms Outside of the Home for Self-Defense was Essential to American 
Triumph over Tyranny in the Revolution 
As a result of expanding British military presence, American colonists formed 
armed militias.43  The British, however, seized the arms in an attempt to stifle 
these militias.44  To combat against these seizures, some of the Colonies passed 
declarations of rights enshrining the right to bear arms for the purpose of self-
defense.45  In addition, carrying firearms outside of the home was a vital 
component of self-defense against Native Americans, European countries, and 
 41. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 592, 595; FREEDMAN, supra note 20, at 43–44. 
 42. See Michael P. O’Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I): 
Judicial Tradition and the Scope of “Bearing Arms” for Self–Defense, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 585, 
637–38 (2012); see also HALBROOK, supra note 17, at 148–49 (discussing the strong sense of 
entitlement to the ability to carry arms in early America); infra Part I.B. 
 43. HALBROOK, supra note 3, at 59–61.  A few years after 1768, the British military 
effectively occupied the city of Boston and began disarming the fleeing colonists by requiring them 
to turn over arms and ammunition before passing through the city limits.  Id. at 59. 
 44. Kates, supra note 38, at 229. In fact, the Battles of Lexington and Concord at the start of 
the Revolutionary War were instigated by such a plan to seize arms and ammunition. Id. 
 45. See, e.g., HALBROOK, supra note 3, at 64.  For example, the Virginia Declaration of Rights 
of 1776 stated: “[T]hat a well-regulated militia, or composed of the body of the people, trained to 
arms, is the proper, natural and safe defense of a free state . . . .” David T. Hardy, The Rise and 
Demise of the “Collective Right” Interpretation of the Second Amendment, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
315, 323 (2011) (quoting Virginia Declaration of Rights § 13 (1776), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/bcp/virg_dor.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2014)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Thomas Jefferson proposed that the Virginia Constitution state, “[n]o freeman 
shall be debarred the use of arms.”  1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 344 (Julian P.  Boyd 
ed., 1950).  The Pennsylvania Declaration of 1776 and Vermont’s Declaration of Rights of 1777 
stated “[t]hat the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and their own State. 
. . .” Randy E. Barnett, Was the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in an 
Organized Militia?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 237, 246 (2004) (reviewing H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM 
G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL 
SILENT (2002)) (quoting Pennsylvania Ratification Convention Minority Proposal (Dec. 12, 1787), 
reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 182 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The North Carolina Declaration of Rights stated “‘that the people have a right to 
bear arms, for defense of the State.’” HALBROOK, supra note 3, at 64 (quoting N.C. Declaration of 
Rights, XVII (1776)).  These declarations could reasonably be read as an assumption of the 
individual right to bear arms outside the home and the expansion of the right for collective use 
against tyrannical rule.  The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights of 1780 stated: “The people have 
a right to keep and to bear arms for the common defence.”  Megan Ruebsamen, The Gun-Shy 
Commonwealth: Self-Defense and Concealed Carry in Post-Heller Massachusetts, 18 SUFFOLK J. 
TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 55, 70 (2013) (quoting MASS. CONST. Pt. 1, art. XVII) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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other individuals.46  Ultimately, the individual right to bear arms provided 
colonists with legal justification and the physical means to fight the British.47  In 
the wake of victory over the British, the American colonists began to build the 
new country through the U.S. Constitution.48 
C.  Enshrining the Right to Bear Arms for Self-Defense Outside of the Home 
through Conventions, the Constitution, the Congress, and the Framers 
Shortly after the Revolutionary War, two political parties formed: the 
Federalists and the Anti-Federalists.49  Although the two parties disagreed on 
the terms of a bill of rights, they both agreed on the importance of an individual’s 
right to bear arms for self-defense.50  When the right to bear arms amendment 
 46. Kates, supra note 38, at 214–16 (explaining early laws requiring citizens to carry weapons 
outside the home). 
 47. See HALBROOK, supra note 3, at 58 (recognizing that an important factor in the American 
victory in the Revolutionary War was the citizens’ ownership of and experience with weapons).  
John Adams, the drafter of the Massachusetts Declaration, “wrote that ‘arms in the hands of citizens 
[may] be used at individual discretion . . . in private self-defence.’”  Id. at 65 (alterations in original). 
 48. See Patrick J. Charles, The Second Amendment in Historiographical Crisis: Why the 
Supreme Court Must Reevaluate the Embarrassing “Standard Model” Moving Forward, 39 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1727, 1781 (2012) (stating that the Founders replaced the Articles of 
Confederation with the Constitution to, inter alia, enumerate the “federal-state division” over 
military powers). 
 49. See HALBROOK, supra note 3, at 65–66.  During the ratification process, the states held 
conventions to discuss the Constitution. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 603–05 
(2008) (highlighting some of the certain state conventions).  Anti-Federalists, like John Adams and 
Thomas Jefferson, preferred “[a]n armed populace.”  See HALBROOK, supra note 3, at 63. 
Moreover, the Anti-Federalists feared that without a bill of rights a free-standing army or select 
militia would disarm the people. See McDonald v. City of Chi., Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3037 (2010); 
see also CLAYTON E. CRAMER, FOR THE DEFENSE OF THEMSELVES AND THE STATE: THE 
ORIGINAL INTENT AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 61 
(1994) (stating that the First Congress “fear[ed] not of an armed population, but of a disarmed 
population”). 
  Federalists, like Noah Webster, “promised that even without a bill of rights, the American 
people would remain armed to such an extent as to be superior to any standing army raised by the 
federal government.”  HALBROOK, supra note 3, at 68.  Philodemos, a prominent constitutional 
commentator, pronounced, “[e]very free man has a right to the use of the press, so he has to the use 
of his arms.” HALBROOK, supra note 3, at 69 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
  During the Virginia convention, Patrick Henry rhetorically asked, “[h]ave we the means 
of resisting disciplined armies, when our only defence, the militia, is put into the hands of 
Congress?” Id. at 73–74 (quoting Patrick Henry, The Debates in the Convention of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (June 2, 1788), in 3 THE 
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787 
386 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836)). This fear led to the enshrinement of the individual right to 
bear arms in the Second Amendment. Id. at 74. 
 50. Kates, supra note 38, at 221 (“The proponents and the opponents of ratification of the 
Constitution equally buttressed their conflicting arguments on the universal belief in an armed 
citizenry.”). 
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was proposed, it underwent several congressional changes51 before the adoption 
of the Second Amendment.52 
Although the Second Amendment does not explicitly state in what manner or 
where an individual can bear arms, at the time of its 1791 ratification, it was 
understood  as protecting a right to bear arms outside of the home.53  For 
example, in 1799 in Philadelphia, Dr. James Reynolds, an Anti-Federalist, 
protested the Alien and Sedition Acts.54  When a Federalist mob rushed 
Reynolds for his protestations, he pulled out a pistol that he carried in his 
overcoat for self-defense.55  At his trial for assault with a deadly weapon, 
Reynolds’ attorney argued that, in the absence of any laws prohibiting it, “every 
man has a right to carry arms who apprehends himself to be in danger.”56  
Reynolds was acquitted on these grounds, thus, suggesting an interpretation of 
the Second Amendment that protected an individual’s right to carry a firearm 
for self-defense outside of the home.57 
The Framers understood the right to bear arms as a right to carry firearms 
outside of the home for self-defense and to protect oneself against tyranny and 
despotism.58  However, the protections of the Second Amendment have been 
misunderstood by generations of Americans.59  The battle over the Second 
 51. Dennis A. Henigan, The Heller Paradox, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1171, 1182–83 (2009) (“The 
First Congress made the following changes to the text before ratifying it: (1) the reference to ‘well 
armed’ in the description of the militia was deleted; (2) the description of the militia as ‘being the 
best security of a free country’ was changed to ‘necessary to the security of a free State’; (3) the 
language barring compelled military service of those ‘religiously scrupulous of bearing arms’ was 
dropped; and (4) the position of the militia language in the Amendment was changed. . . . ”). 
 52. U.S. CONST. amend. II.  Congress responded to state calls for a declaration of rights by 
adopting various amendments to the Constitution, which ultimately became the Bill of Rights.  See 
ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN AMERICA 107–09 
(2011) (discussing the hesitancy of some to ratify the Constitution without a Bill of Rights).  
Ultimately, Congress adopted the Second Amendment: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary 
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”  
U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 53. See, e.g., HALBROOK, supra note 17, 317 (noting that George Washington carried a gun 
for self-protection during his travels). 
 54. See David B. Kopel & Clayton E. Cramer, The Keystone of the Second Amendment: The 
Quakers, the Pennsylvania Constitution, and the Flawed Scholarship of Nathan Kozuskanich, 19 
WIDENER L.J. 277, 300 (2010). 
 55. Id. at 300–01 (stating Pennsylvania law did not prohibit carrying a firearm for personal 
protection). 
 56. SAUL CORNELL, A WELL REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE 
ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 91 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 57. Id. at 92. 
 58. See supra Part I.C.  The right to bear arms was sacred and dear to revolutionary heroes 
such as Patrick Henry, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and George Washington.  HALBROOK, 
supra note 17, at 315–17 (discussing the Framers’ interest in firearms). 
 59. See HALBROOK, supra note 17, at 310–20 (summarizing the Framers’ views on firearms).  
There were Supreme Court cases concerning the Second Amendment in the antebellum era, but 
Heller is the determinative case on the matter. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 
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Amendment’s interpretation has continued, while reaching some conclusiveness 
nearly two centuries later.60 
II.  GUNFIGHTS IN THE COURTHOUSE: THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN JUDICIAL 
CROSSHAIRS 
A.  Heller & McDonald: Finding that the Core of the Second Amendment is an 
Individual Right to Bear Arms for Self-Defense 
In District of Columbia v. Heller,61 the Supreme Court grappled with the 
question of whether the Second Amendment protected an individual right or a 
collective right to bear arms.62 In its first extensive analysis of the Second 
Amendment, the Court considered the District of Columbia’s ban on the 
possession of operable handguns inside the home.63  The Court concluded that 
to “bear arms” meant to carry a weapon for purposes unrelated to militia 
service.64  According to the Heller Court, the Second Amendment “guarantee[s] 
634–35 (2008) (determining that the core of the Second Amendment was, is, and always will be an 
individual right to lawful armed self-defense). 
 60. See infra  Part II.  Typically, most Second Amendment cases arise from handgun 
regulatory schemes.  The first set of cases concerns the issuance of permits to purchase handguns. 
The second set concerns the issuance of permits to carry a handgun in public. See, e.g., Drake v. 
Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Drake v. Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014); 
Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 934 (7th Cir. 2012).  The issuance of a carry license or permit 
begins with an applicant filing an application with an administrator, local official, or sometimes a 
law enforcement officer.  In some instances, if the administrator approves, the judiciary may review 
the permit’s issuance.  In the event of a denial, the applicant can appeal the decision to the trial 
court. 
  A permit to purchase is a prerequisite to buy a handgun, while a permit to carry is a 
prerequisite to carry a handgun. The statutory schemes vary, but the components are similar. Most 
litigation surrounds the restrictive demonstrations required to obtain a permit or license to carry a 
handgun in public. For example, New Jersey requires an applicant to show a “justifiable need” to 
carry a handgun. Drake, 724 F.3d at 429 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-4(d) (West 2014)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  In New York, the applicant must show a “proper cause” to 
carry a handgun in public.  Kachalsky v. Cnty of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Maryland requires the applicant 
to have a “good and substantial reason” to carry a handgun in public. Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 
F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting MD. CODE ANN., Public Safety, § 5-306(a)(5)(ii) (LexisNexis 
2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 61. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 62. Id. at 579 (asserting that each amendment that refers to “rights of the people . . . . 
[U]nambiguously refer[s] to individual rights, not ‘collective’ rights”). 
 63. Id. at 635 (stating that the District’s gun ban case “represents this Court’s first in-depth 
examination of the Second Amendment”). 
 64. Id. at 584–86 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Furthermore, the Court noted that: 
[A] most familiar meaning is, as the Constitution’s Second Amendment . . . indicate[s]: 
wear, bear, or carry . . . upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose 
. . . of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with 
another person. 
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the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”65 In 
other words, the Second Amendment’s core is a right to bear arms for the lawful 
purpose of self-defense.66  However, the Court stated that the Second 
Amendment right was not unlimited.67 
Though the Second Amendment protects a right of self-defense, the Court said 
there can be no doubt about the validity of “longstanding prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the 
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government 
buildings.”68  In addition, the Court rejected any public policy argument against 
the Second Amendment right to bear arms based on gun violence statistics 
because “the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain 
policy choices off the table.”69  Ultimately, the Court held that the District’s ban 
on operable gun possession in the home violated the Second Amendment’s core 
right to keep and bear arms for the lawful purpose of self-defense.70  However, 
limited by the facts of the case before the Court, Heller did not directly address 
Id. at 584 (alterations in original) (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 143 (1998) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Considering the textual analysis of 
the Second Amendment, the Court asserted that the Second Amendment’s wording infers that it 
was a codification of a pre-existing right to bear arms for self-defense.  Id. at 594–95.  Heller 
implicitly assumed that the Second Amendment extends to carrying outside the home. See Moore, 
702 F.3d at 935 (noting that Heller’s analysis of the Second Amendment’s history did not speak in 
limiting terms); see also Michael C. Dorf, Does Heller Protect a Right to Carry Guns Outside the 
Home?, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 225, 227–28 (2008) (arguing that Heller’s logic applies to carrying 
arms both inside and outside the home). 
 65. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592; see Acosta, supra note 13, at 1122–24 (discussing the Court’s 
analysis in Heller). 
 66. The Court held that the right to bear arms was primarily a right for the purpose of self-
defense, given the historical analysis of the Second Amendment. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 599 
(stating that the “central component” of the right to bear arms is self-defense); see also id. at 630 
(recognizing that bearing arms for “the core lawful purpose of self-defense” is constitutional).  
Likewise, Heller noted that “the inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second 
Amendment right.” Id. at 628. 
 67. See id. at 595 (explaining that the Second Amendment does not “protect the right of 
citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment to 
protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose”). 
 68. Id. at 626. 
 69. Id. at 636; but see Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 438 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. 
Drake v. Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014) (stating that the statute would be valid even if the state 
could not provide a report to prove its statistical assertions that its gun control law saves lives). 
 70. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635; see id. at 595 (“[T]he Second Amendment conferred an individual 
right to keep and bear arms.”).  Because the District’s handgun ban extended “to the home[] where 
the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute,” id. at 628, it violated “the right of 
law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”  Id. at 635.  Therefore, 
the District of Columbia’s ban on having operable handguns inside the home was found to be 
unconstitutional.  Id. 
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whether the Second Amendment protects a right to bear arms for self-defense 
outside of the home.71 
In McDonald v. City of Chicago,72 decided two years after Heller in 2010, the 
Supreme Court struck down Chicago’s ban on the possession of handguns inside 
the home.73  The McDonald Court held that the Second Amendment was 
applicable to the states through incorporation and “protect[ed] a personal right 
to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, most notably for self-defense within 
the home.”74  In doing so, the Court reaffirmed Heller’s holding that the Second 
Amendment safeguards the right to bear arms for self-defense.75  According to 
the Court, the core focus of the Second Amendment is the ancient right of self-
defense.76  Moreover, the right to bear arms for self-defense is a long-established 
belief and value of the American people that is not contingent on “controversial 
public safety implications.”77 
As in Heller, the Court rejected public policy arguments based on public 
safety concerns over increased gun violence, because the Second Amendment 
right to bear arms foreclosed any policy considerations.78  However, the Court 
recognized that the Amendment does not afford an unlimited right to carry a gun 
for any purpose and reaffirmed the constitutionality of the longstanding 
prohibitions listed in Heller.79  Again, as in Heller, the nature of the facts 
in McDonald did not warrant exploration of the Second Amendment’s 
protections outside of the home, and the Court did not address that issue.80 
 71. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–30 (focusing the Court’s analysis on the applicability of the 
gun regulation on the right to self-defense); see also Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935 (7th 
Cir. 2012) (“[T]he Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question whether the Second 
Amendment creates a right of self-defense outside the home.”). 
 72. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 73. Id. at 3026. 
 74. Id. at 3044. 
 75. Id. at 3026 (reiterating that Heller “held that the Second Amendment protects the right to 
keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense”). 
 76. Id. at 3036 (“Self-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from ancient 
times to the present day, and in Heller, we held that individual self-defense is ‘the central 
component’ of the Second Amendment right.” (footnote omitted)).  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 
(summarizing the Court’s historical analysis that recognized the Second Amendment’s codification 
of an “inherent right” of self-defense). 
 77. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3045.  Even though the early colonial fears about Congress 
disarming the people faded, the right to bear arms remained exalted for self-defense. Id. at 3038. 
 78. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3045–46 (noting that “[t]he right to keep and bear arms, 
however, is not the only constitutional right that has controversial public safety implications”). 
 79. Id. at 3047.  The longstanding prohibitions listed by Heller are: in sensitive areas, by 
felons, and by the mentally ill.  Id. 
 80. Id. at 3088–89 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Neither submission requires the Court to express 
an opinion on whether the Fourteenth Amendment places any limit on the power of States to 
regulate possession, use, or carriage of firearms outside the home.”). 
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B.  The Fight over the Second Amendment Carries on 
Current Second Amendment litigation has focused on whether the Second 
Amendment protects an individual’s right to carry a handgun for the purpose of 
self-defense outside of the home.81  These cases generally arise out of the denial 
of a carry permit or license to carry handguns outside of the home for the lawful 
purpose of self-defense.82  Though some states restrict a person’s ability to carry 
a handgun through a regulatory scheme requiring a demonstration of a particular 
need to carry a firearm outside of the home,83 other states do not employ these 
restrictions.84  The federal courts of appeal have adopted two distinct approaches 
to the question of whether the Second Amendment protects a right to carry 
arms extra domum for the purpose of self-defense.85 
The first approach finds that the Second Amendment protects a right to carry 
firearms outside of the home for the lawful purpose of self-defense.86  The 
second approach does not decide whether the Second Amendment protects a 
right to carry firearms outside of the home, but first assumes the Second 
Amendment’s applicability before applying intermediate scrutiny.87 
 
 81. See, e.g., Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 934 (7th Cir. 2012) (challenging an Illinois 
statute that prohibited carrying an easily accessible, loaded firearm); see also Woollard v. 
Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 868 (4th Cir. 2013) (stating that the lower court determined the Second 
Amendment extended outside the home), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 422 (2013). However, the battle 
is not only in the courts.  The United States House of Representatives has put forth a bill to remedy 
at least one problem associated with carrying outside of the home.  See National Right-to-Carry 
Reciprocity Act of 2013, H.R. 2995, 113th Congress § 2(a) (2013) (proposing that, under certain 
circumstances, a person may carry concealed weapons in public). 
 82. See, e.g., Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 427 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Drake 
v. Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014). 
 83. See, e.g., Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating that 
the New York law at issue, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(2)(f) (McKinney 2014) required a 
demonstration of a “proper cause”), cert. denied sub nom. Kachalsky v. Cacace, 133 S. Ct. 1806 
(2013). 
 84. See, e.g., Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 18–12–203(1)(a) (West 2013) that only restricts non-residents). 
 85. See, e.g., Martinez, 707 F.3d at 1201 (stating that there is no right outside the home); 
Moore, 702 F.3d at 942 (holding that there is a right to bear arms outside of the home for non-
residents); Woollard, 712 F.3d at 881–82 (assuming that there is a right to bear arms outside of the 
home); see also Alexander C. Barrett, Taking Aim at Felony Possession, 93 B.U. L. REV. 163, 177 
(2013) (“[T]he lower courts have had to determine the appropriate analysis themselves, guided by 
the Supreme Court’s approach in Heller. The courts have not taken a uniform approach.”). 
 86. See Moore, 702 F.3d at 942 (explaining that “[t]he Supreme Court has decided that the 
amendment confers a right to bear arms for self-defense,” and that “evidence . . . is consistent with 
concluding that a right to carry firearms in public may promote self-defense”). 
 87. See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 881–82 (“[W]e assume that . . . Woollard’s Second Amendment 
right is burdened by the good-and-substantial-reason requirement, we further conclude that such 
burden is constitutionally permissible.”). 
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1.  The First Approach: The Second Amendment Protects a Right to Bear 
Arms Outside of the Home 
In Moore v. Madigan,88 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
addressed a constitutional challenge to an Illinois statute that prohibited a person 
from carrying a handgun outside the home for self-defense.89  The Seventh 
Circuit concluded that the Second Amendment, as interpreted by Heller, 
“confers a right to bear arms for self-defense, which is as important outside the 
home as inside.”90  Overturning the district court, the Seventh Circuit held that 
the right to bear arms included the right to carry arms outside of the home for 
the lawful purpose of self-defense.91 
The heart of the Seventh Circuit’s analysis focused on the implications 
of Heller for the Second Amendment’s protections outside of the home.92  First, 
the Seventh Circuit stated that, although Heller and McDonald noted that the 
right to engage in armed self-defense was strongest inside the home,93 it did not 
follow from this assertion that the need for self-defense was not important 
outside of the home.94  Second, the Seventh Circuit declared that Heller 
 88. 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 89. See id. at 934.  The statute provided that “[a] person commits the offense of unlawful use 
of weapons when he knowingly . . . [c]arries or possesses in any vehicle or concealed on or about 
his person except when on his land or in his own abode, legal dwelling.”  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/24-1(a)(4) (West 2010).  Exceptions to the law include police officers, security guards, 
target shooters, and persons on their private real property.  Moore, 702 F.3d at 934.  The issue for 
the court was whether carrying guns in public is protected by the Second Amendment; the case did 
not concern handgun ownership. Id. at 934, 938. 
  In a similar case, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia recently 
found that the Second Amendment protects a right to carry arms outside of the home for the purpose 
of lawful self-defense and struck down the District’s ban on carrying weapons outside of the home.  
Palmer v. D.C., No. 1:09-CV-1482 (FJS), 2014 WL 3702854, *7–8 (D.D.C. July 24, 2014) (noting 
that the recent Supreme Court decisions mandated such a finding). 
 90. See id. at 942. 
 91. In the district court case, Moore v. Madigan, 842 F .Supp. 2d 1092 (C.D. Ill.), rev’d, 702 
F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012), plaintiffs moved for a preliminary or permanent injunction enjoining the 
enforcement of two Illinois state weapons statutes that prohibit the carrying of loaded and operable 
firearms in public.  Id. at 1095–96, 1099.  The defendant, the attorney general, moved to dismiss.  
Id. at 1096.  The plaintiffs argued that the Second Amendment protects the rights of an individual 
to carry firearms in public.  Id. at 1098.  The district court held that Heller’s narrow holding is that 
the Second Amendment only provides an individual right to lawfully bear firearms in the home for 
the purpose of self-defense.  Id. at 1102.  Moreover, the court explained that “[n]either Heller nor 
McDonald recognizes a Second Amendment right to bear arms outside of the home.”  Id. at 1101.  
Because Heller and McDonald addressed the Second Amendment only within the purview of the 
home, the court reasoned that the Second Amendment right to bear arms is limited to self-defense 
inside the home. See id. at 1102. 
 92. See Moore, 702 F.3d at 935. Discussing Heller, the court stated that it cannot “ignore the 
implication of the analysis that the constitutional right of armed self-defense is broader than the 
right to have a gun in one’s home.” Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id.  The court continued its analysis of Heller and McDonald by adding that “‘the need 
for defense of self, family, and property is most acute’ in the home, but that doesn’t mean it is not 
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guaranteed a right to carry in case of confrontation, and, therefore, by 
implication, the Second Amendment protected a right to carry outside of the 
home because “[c]onfrontations are not limited to the home.”95 
Next, following Heller, the Seventh Circuit considered the text and the history 
of the Second Amendment.  The court looked to the plain language of the Second 
Amendment to uncover its meaning and noted that “bearing arms” would have 
been a peculiar and improper phrase to apply only in the home and not outside 
of the home.96  Therefore, the plain language of the Second Amendment, the 
Court observed, supported the conclusion that “[a] right to bear arms thus 
implies a right to carry a loaded gun outside the home.”97 
Furthermore, the court, aware of Heller’s historical Second Amendment 
decision, noted that Heller’s holding was based on a historical analysis of the 
Second Amendment and that the lower courts were bound by that 
determination.98  The court stated that although the same historical 
circumstances did not exist in the modern world as they did when the Second 
Amendment was ratified in 1791, the protections of the Amendment remained 
the same in the twenty-first century.99  The Second Amendment’s core 
protection of armed self-defense, the court reasoned, was more likely to be 
needed to defend oneself on the streets than in one’s own home.100  Furthermore, 
the Seventh Circuit explained that “[t]o confine the right to be armed to the home 
[was] to divorce the Second Amendment from the right of self-defense described 
in Heller and McDonald.”101 
Following the Supreme Court’s lead in Heller, the Seventh Circuit again 
emphasized that the right to bear arms was not dependent on gun violence 
statistics.102  The Supreme Court removed this policy choice from consideration, 
acute outside of the home.” Id. (citation omitted) (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 
570, 628 (2008)). 
 95. Id. at 936; see also id. at 935–36 (stating that “Heller repeatedly invokes a broader Second 
Amendment right than the right to have a gun in one’s home, as when it says that the amendment 
‘guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 592)). 
 96. Id. at 936. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 937–38 (referencing Heller repeatedly and relying on its analysis and stating “we 
are bound by the Supreme Court’s historical analysis because it was central to the Court’s holding 
in Heller”). 
 99. See id. at 936–37 (recognizing the threat of attacks from Native Americans is no longer 
present). 
 100. Id. at 937.  There is a stronger self-defense claim in public than in the home. Id.  It would 
be hard to imagine a woman exercising self-defense more often inside the home than outside, of 
the home. She is more vulnerable outside without any protections than behind her closed apartment 
doors. Id. Especially, because, as in this case, most murders in Chicago are committed outside of 
the home rather than inside. Id. 
 101. Id. at 937. 
 102. See id. at 939 (“Anyway the Supreme Court made clear in Heller that it wasn’t going to 
make the right to bear arms depend on casualty counts.”). 
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and, therefore, the Seventh Circuit stated that, in Second Amendment 
jurisprudence, empirical gun violence data was irrelevant.103  Rather, what 
matters is self-defense.104 
The Seventh Circuit accepted limited bans on carrying outside of the home, 
focusing on the longstanding bans listed in Heller.105  However, Moore stated 
that a ban cannot apply to either every class of persons or every public place.106  
In addition, because the Illinois statute was not one of the acceptable 
longstanding prohibitions, it destroyed the Second Amendment right to bear 
arms for self-defense outside of the home.107 
Like the Seventh Circuit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
in Peruta v. San Diego County,108 held that the Second Amendment protected a 
right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense both inside and outside of the 
home.109  In Peruta, the Ninth Circuit analyzed a California statute that required 
a concealed carry permit applicant to attest to a good moral character, attend a 
training course, and demonstrate a “good cause” to carry a firearm in public.110  
“Good cause,” according to the San Diego County Sheriff, meant a “sufficiently 
pressing need for self-protection” compared to the general population.111  Each 
plaintiff was either denied a concealed carry permit by San Diego County for 
lacking a “good cause” to carry outside of the home or declined to apply, fearing 
that they would not meet the “good cause” requirement.112  The Peruta court, 
relying heavily on Heller’s determination that the core of the Second 
Amendment’s right to bear arms is self-defense, reiterated that any statute that 
infringed on the right to bear arms for self-defense destroyed the Second 
 103. Id. at 939. 
 104. See id. at 942. 
 105. Id. at 940–41. 
 106. Id. at 940.  But the court said there was a justification to restrict the rights of those who 
are mentally ill or criminals and in public places like courtrooms, government buildings, or public 
schools because these are longstanding prohibitions acknowledged by Heller.  Id. at 940–41; see 
also id. at 940 (“[A] person can preserve an undiminished right of self-defense by not entering 
those places . . . .”).  Moreover, there is nothing that would question the ban of guns for 
undocumented aliens, children, and others.  Id. at 940–41.  However, the court hypothesized that it 
is reasonable to condition the right to bear arms outside of the home on a gun safety course or some 
other training procedure. See id. at 941 (stating that a person who is not trained in firearms “is a 
menace to himself and others”). 
 107. See People v. Aguilar, 2 N.E.3d 321, 326–28 (Ill. 2013) (agreeing with the Seventh Circuit 
and holding that the Illinois statute discussed in Moore violated the Second Amendment’s right to 
carry a firearm outside of the home for the purpose of self-defense). 
 108. 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 109. Id. at 1166–67 (“Put simply, a law that destroys (rather than merely burdens) a right 
central to the Second Amendment must be struck down.” (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008))). 
 110. Id. at 1148. 
 111. Id. (stating that “California law delegates to each city and county the power to . . .” define 
“good cause”). 
 112. Id. 
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Amendment right.113  Because the San Diego County’s definition of “good 
cause” infringed on the right to bear arms for self-defense, the scheme was 
deemed unconstitutional.114 
The Ninth Circuit, like the Seventh Circuit, determined that Heller’s analytic 
approach controls the analysis of Second Amendment rights.115  First, 
like Heller, the Court asked whether the activity fell within the scope of the 
Second Amendment’s protection.116  To determine whether the Second 
Amendment protected a right to bear arms outside of the home, the Ninth Circuit 
consulted the text and history of the Amendment.117  Based on the text, the court 
concluded that “bear” means to “carry for . . . confrontation” inside and outside 
of the home.118  Based on the post-ratification history of the Second 
Amendment, the court determined that the Second Amendment protected the 
right to bear arms outside of the home for self-defense.119  Thus, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded the text and history of the Second Amendment confirmed that 
it protected a right to armed self-defense outside of the home.120 
Next, like the Supreme Court in Heller, the Peruta court asked whether the 
challenged law infringed on the right to bear arms.121  To determine whether the 
statute infringed on the right, the court inquired into whether the statute 
burdened or destroyed the right.122  If the statute destroys the right to bear arms, 
then it is unconstitutional.123  California does not allow open carry and the only 
way to bear arms is through a concealed carry permit.124  Because there was no 
other way to carry than to carry concealed arms and because self-defense was 
not considered a “good cause,” the Ninth Circuit held that the statute destroyed 
the core protection of the Second Amendment.125  Thus, after this two-step 
analysis, the court concluded that San Diego’s practice was unconstitutional.126 
 113. See id. at 1153, 1172. 
 114. Id. at 1179. 
 115. Id. at 1155 (noting historical “findings” that contradict the Supreme Court’s findings in 
Heller are not applicable to determine the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms). 
 116. Id. at 1150. 
 117. See id. at 1150–51. 
 118. Id. at 1151–52 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584 (2008)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 119. See id. at 1156–60 (performing a significant historical analysis of “the nineteenth-century 
case law interpreting the Second Amendment”). 
 120. See id. at 1166 (noting its holding conforms with other circuits). 
 121. Id. at 1167. 
 122. Id. at 1168. 
 123. See id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. (referring to the statute as a “rationing system”). 
 126. Id. at 1179. 
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2.  The Second Approach: A Judicial Reluctance to Decide the Scope of the 
Second Amendment’s Application Outside of the Home 
The second approach is categorized by an assumption.  The federal circuit 
courts assume that Second Amendment rights have some application outside of 
the home, but the courts do not determine the scope of the right.  In Woollard v. 
Gallagher,127 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit confronted a 
challenge to a Maryland regulatory scheme that required an applicant to 
demonstrate a “good and substantial reason . . . to carry . . . a handgun.”128  The 
court, “without . . . demarcating the reach of the Second Amendment,” reversed 
the district court’s ruling that the Second Amendment protected a right to carry 
a firearm outside of the home for the lawful purpose of self-defense.129  The 
Fourth Circuit, relying upon its precedent, stated that it was not necessary for 
lower courts to search for the meaning of the Second Amendment.130  Rather, 
the court stated that lower courts should await instructions from the Supreme 
Court on the issue.131 
However, the Fourth Circuit assumed, for the sake of argument, that there was 
a right to bear arms outside of the home.132  The Woollard court concluded that 
the “good and substantial reason” criterion for a carry permit was permissible 
because it did not burden an individual’s right to bear arms for self-defense.133  
The “good and substantial reason” criterion did not burden the right to bear arms 
because, as the court held, the state’s interest in public safety outweighed an 
individual’s interest in self-defense.134  Therefore, Second Amendment rights 
outside the home may be restricted more than inside the home.135 
 127. 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 422 (2013). 
 128. Id. at 868 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., Public Safety, § 5-306(a)(5)(ii) (LexisNexis 2012)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 129. Woollard, 712 F.3d at 868.  In Woollard, at the district court, the plaintiff, an applicant 
for a permit to carry a handgun outside of the home, brought action against the state claiming that 
the requirement to demonstrate “good and substantial reason” for the issuance of a carry permit 
violated the Second Amendment.  Woollard v. Sheridan, 863 F. Supp. 2d 462, 465–66 (D. Md. 
2012), rev’d sub nom. Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
422 (2013).  The district court decided it had to determine whether the statute “burden[ed] any 
Second Amendment right at all.”  Id. at 469.  Relying on Heller, the district court stated that the 
right for self-defense was strongest inside the home, implying that it existed in a less acute form 
outside of the home.  Id. Moreover, the district court reasoned that self-defense is an in rem need 
wherever a person is located, and, therefore, found that the Second Amendment’s protections 
extend beyond the home.  Id. 
 130. Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876 (stating that when examining the scope of the Second 
Amendment outside of the home, a previous Fourth Circuit case controls review). 
 131. Id. at 872. 
 132. Id. at 876. 
 133. Id. at 881–82. 
 134. Id. at 882. 
 135. Id. at 876. 
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In Kachalsky v. County of Westchester,136 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit heard a constitutional challenge to a restrictive gun carry permit 
scheme.137  Specifically, the court considered whether a New York statute that 
required a showing of “proper cause” to conceal a handgun in public violated 
the Second Amendment.138  Under New York law, to secure a concealed carry 
permit for the purpose of self-defense, an applicant needed to demonstrate 
“proper cause,” which was defined as “a special need for self-protection 
distinguishable from that of the general community or of persons engaged in the 
same profession.”139  The plaintiffs each sought to carry firearms outside of the 
home for purposes of self-defense, and all were denied a permit.140 
The Second Circuit emphasized that the Second Amendment protections “are 
at their zenith within the home” and cautioned that its implications outside the 
home are a “vast ‘terra incognita.’”141  With no clear direction from the Supreme 
Court regarding the Second Amendment’s protections outside of the home, the 
Second Circuit assumed that the Second Amendment has “some” application 
outside of the home but did not make a conclusive decision one way or the 
other.142  Then, the court distinguished Kachalsky from Heller.143 
Specifically, the Second Circuit said that the distinction between the cases was 
the need to promote public safety.144  The Second Circuit noted that there were 
no public safety concerns in Heller because the ban applied to firearms inside 
 136. 701 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Kachalsky v. Cacace, 133 S. Ct. 
1806 (2013). 
 137. Id. at 83. 
 138. Id.  According to the court, under the New York law, in order to qualify for a carry license, 
one must have a handgun license.  Id. at 83–84.  The handgun licenses are restricted to those over 
the age of twenty-one who have a good moral character and lack a criminal history or mental illness. 
Id. at 86 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(1)(a)–(c), (i) (McKinney 2014)).  According to the 
court, the statute does not supply a definition for “proper cause.”  Id.  Consequently, New York 
courts have determined “proper cause” to include carrying for the purposes of target shooting, 
hunting, or self-defense.  Id. 
 139. Id. (quoting Klenosky v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 428 N.Y.S.2d 256, 257 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1980)). 
 140. See id. at 83; see also id. at 88 (“Plaintiffs’ applications were all denied for the same 
reason: Failure to show any facts demonstrating a need for self-protection distinguishable from that 
of the general public.”). 
 141. Id. at 89 (quoting United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011)).  
However, the Seventh Circuit later claimed that the “‘vast terra incognita’ has been opened to 
judicial exploration by Heller and McDonald.”  See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 
2012).  It is the lower courts’ job to explore the limits of the Second Amendment and to 
substantively rule on these issues, rather than assume for the sake of argument that a right exists, 
because without the courts acting on this the Supreme Court will never be able to give direction to 
the lower courts. 
 142. See Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 89. 
 143. Id. at 94.  New York’s scheme concerned carrying handguns in public, while Heller 
concerned a ban within the home.  See id. 
 144. See id. (noting public safety usually outweighs the Second Amendment interest in self-
defense). 
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the home, while the statute in Kachalsky restricted carrying in public due to 
public safety concerns.145  Thus, in Kachalsky, handgun regulation was a means 
to achieve the state’s goal of promoting public safety.146  The Kachalsky court 
concluded that the statute did not infringe on the right to bear arms because the 
“proper cause” restriction on carrying handguns was substantially related to New 
York’s interest in protecting the public and preventing crime and it promoted 
those interests.147  Therefore, the court noted that this public safety interest 
outweighs an individual’s right to bear arms in public.148 
III.  DRAKE V. FILKO: THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND 
AMENDMENT’S SCOPE OUTSIDE OF THE HOME 
A.  Majority View: Drake v. Filko 
In Drake v. Filko,149 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit weighed 
in on the circuit split concerning the Second Amendment’s protections of the 
right to bear arms outside of the home.150  In this case, the appellants were each 
denied a New Jersey concealed carry permit because they failed to demonstrate 
the statutory prerequisite of a “justifiable need” to carry a handgun for self-
defense in public.151  The New Jersey statute defined “justifiable need” as a 
special need for self-defense apart from the general population.152 
The district court held that the statute was a longstanding restriction 
contemplated by Heller and, therefore, did not violate an individual’s right to 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 98.  The restriction is in the interest of “public safety and crime prevention.” Id. 
 147. See id. at 98–99 (noting that it was unnecessary to apply strict scrutiny to the statute). 
 148. Id. at 100. 
 149. 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Drake v. Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 
(2014). 
 150. Id. at 431. 
 151. Id. at 428–29 (stating that appellants “were denied, however, because pursuant to [N.J. 
STAT. ANN.] § 2C:58–4(c) either a police official or superior court judge determined that they failed 
to satisfy the ‘justifiable need’ requirement”). 
 152. Id. at 428 (stating that “justifiable need” means “the urgent necessity for self-protection, 
as evidenced by specific threats or previous attacks which demonstrate a special danger to the 
applicant’s life that cannot be avoided by means other than by issuance of a permit to carry a 
handgun” (quoting N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:54-24(d)(1) (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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bear arms.153  The Third Circuit agreed, while recognizing that the Second 
Amendment’s application outside of the home was an unsettled issue.154 
The court stated that Heller and McDonald only conferred an individual right 
to bear arms inside the home for the lawful purpose of self-defense.155  Although 
the court acknowledged that the Seventh Circuit in Moore determined 
that Heller’s historical analysis implied that the Second Amendment protected a 
right outside of the home, the Drake court suggested that the Seventh Circuit 
“may have read Heller too broadly.”156  In doing so, the Third Circuit rejected 
the appellants’ argument that a historical analysis was necessary because 
“[h]istory and tradition do not speak with one voice.”157 
The court declined to perform a historical analysis of the Second Amendment 
and did not decide whether an “individual right to bear arms for the purpose of 
self defense extend[ed] beyond the home.”158  Rather, a determination of the 
Second Amendment’s protections outside of the home was “not necessary to 
[its] conclusion.”159  Instead, the Third Circuit continued its analysis by 
“[a]ssuming that the Second Amendment individual right to bear arms [did] 
apply beyond the home.”160 
Under this assumption, the court questioned whether the “‘justifiable need’ 
[requirement] to carry a handgun for self-defense burden[ed] conduct within the 
scope of that Second Amendment guarantee.”161  Applying intermediate 
 153. Id. at 429.  In the district court, the plaintiff claimed that there is a fundamental right to 
carry a firearm under the Second Amendment.  See Piszczatoski v. Filko, 840 F. Supp. 2d 813, 816 
(D.N.J. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. 
Drake v. Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014).  The court declined to find such a right outside of the 
home because as it understood Heller only protects a right to carry inside the home.  Id. at 816.  
Furthermore, the Court reasoned, the historical evidence Heller cited is unclear on whether there is 
a right to carry outside of the home.  See id. at 824.  However, the court assumed that there is a 
right to bear arms outside of the home, even though it came to the opposite conclusion that there is 
no right outside of the home.  See id. at 826 (stating an absolute ban on carrying weapons outside 
the home would be unconstitutional).  The court then upheld the gun regulation because it passed 
intermediate scrutiny.  Id. at 837. 
 154. Drake, 724 F.3d at 429–30. 
 155. See id. at 430 (“Taken together, these cases made clear that ‘Second Amendment 
guarantees are at their zenith within the home.’” (quoting Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 
F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013)). 
 156. Id. at 430 (emphasis added). 
 157. Id. at 431 (alteration in original) (quoting Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 91) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (rejecting appellants contention that “‘[t]ext, history, tradition and precedent all 
confirm that [individuals] enjoy a right to publicly carry arms for their defense’” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Appellant’s Brief and Appendix Volume I at 12, Kachalsky v. Cnty. of 
Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013) (No. 12-1150))). 
 158. Id. (“At this time, we are not inclined to address this contention by engaging in a round 
of full-blown historical analysis, given other courts’ extensive consideration of the history and 
tradition of the Second Amendment.”). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. (emphasis added). 
 161. Id. 
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scrutiny, the court concluded that, according to Heller, “the ‘justifiable need 
standard’” to obtain a permit to carry publicly a handgun for self-defense 
“qualifie[d] as a ‘longstanding,’ ‘presumptively lawful’ regulation.”162  In other 
words, the requirement for a “justifiable need” to carry a handgun for lawful 
self-defense is a proper, longstanding restriction on an individual’s Second 
Amendment rights.163  Therefore, the court concluded that New Jersey’s 
“justifiable need” requirement to carry a handgun did not burden the Second 
Amendment right to bear arms outside of the home for self-defense, and the 
“justifiable need” statutory scheme was constitutional.164 
B.  Dissent: The Second Amendment Protects a Right to Carry a Firearm 
Outside the Home 
The dissent in Drake, however, rejected the majority’s reading of Heller.165  
The dissenting judge stated that the interpretation of the Second Amendment 
under Heller and McDonald protected an individual’s right to keep and bear 
arms for the purpose of lawful self-defense.166  Because the Second Amendment 
secures the right to bear arms for self-defense, and as the need for self-defense 
is arguably greater outside of the home than inside the home, the dissent believed 
that the Second Amendment must apply outside of the home.167  Furthermore, 
the dissent noted that Heller and McDonald explained that the Second 
Amendment removed certain policy choices from the legislature.168  Moreover, 
New Jersey’s policy choice to restrict the right to bear arms to a “justifiable 
need” violated the Second Amendment’s core protection of a right to armed self-
defense.169  The dissent stated that “interpreting the Second Amendment to 
 162. Id. at 434. 
 163. See id. (“[A]ssuming that the Second Amendment confers upon individuals some right to 
carry arms outside the home, we would nevertheless conclude that the ‘justifiable need’ standard . 
. . is a longstanding regulation that enjoys presumptive constitutionality under the teachings 
articulated in Heller . . . .”). 
 164. See id. at 439–40 (“We refuse Appellants’ invitation to intrude upon the sound judgment 
and discretion of the State of New Jersey, and we conclude that the “justifiable need” standard 
withstands intermediate scrutiny.”). 
 165. Id. at 440 (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (“New Jersey’s law conditioning the issuance of a 
permit to carry a handgun in public on a showing of ‘justifiable need’ contravenes the Second 
Amendment.”). 
 166. Id. at 444–45 (explaining that the Supreme Court’s historical understanding of an 
individual’s right to bear arms protects an individual in both public and private settings). 
 167. See id. at 445–46 (“[T]he legal principle enunciated in Heller is not confined to the facts 
presented in that case.”); see also id. at 445 (stating that the Supreme Court declined to apply the 
Second Amendment outside of the home, because the case was limited to the facts at issue).  
Moreover, the Second Amendment, according to the dissent, applies outside of the home.  Id. 
 168. See id. at 442 (“[T]he question presented is not whether New Jersey’s justifiable need 
requirement is a reasonable, let alone a wise, policy choice.  Rather, we must decide whether the 
New Jersey statute violates the Second Amendment.”). 
 169. See id. at 444 (“[T]he Heller Court repeatedly noted that the Second Amendment protects 
an inherent right to self-defense . . . .”). 
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extend outside the home [was] merely a commonsense application of the legal 
principle established in Heller and reiterated in McDonald: that ‘the Second 
Amendment protect[ed] the right to bear arms for the purpose of self-
defense.’”170 
IV.  THE TEXT AND HISTORY DICTATE THAT THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
PROTECTS THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS OUTSIDE OF THE HOME 
A.  The Third Circuit Unpersuasively Assumed the Scope of the Second 
Amendment Without Discussing Its Text and History 
Historically, the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms “is, and has always 
been, an individual right” to armed self-defense.171  The Supreme Court, in its 
discussion of the Second Amendment in Heller, held that the Second 
Amendment protected an individual’s right to bear arms for the purpose of self-
defense because of the Amendment’s text and historical origins.172  The Third 
Circuit’s decision in Drake ignored the text and history of the Second 
Amendment and arrived at a flawed conclusion. 
First, the text of the Second Amendment implies a right to bear arms outside 
of the home for self-defense.  As interpreted by Heller, the right “to bear 
arms”173 refers to a right to carry for the purpose of confrontation.174  Confining 
the right “to bear arms” to the home, as the Seventh and Ninth Circuits noted, is 
nonsensical, improper, and an awkward use of the phrase.175 
Second, if restricted solely to the home, the right “to bear arms” would lose 
its intended meaning.176  The idea of carrying a gun for self-defense “does not 
exactly conjure up images of father stuffing a six-shooter in his pajama’s pocket 
before heading downstairs to start the morning’s coffee.”177  Rather, it brings to 
 170. Id. at 446 (quoting McDonald v. City of Chi., Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010)). 
 171. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1155 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 616 (2008)). 
 172. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 595; id. at 622 (“This holding is not only consistent with, but 
positively suggests, that the Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms 
. . . .”). 
 173. Id. at 584 (“At the time of the founding, as now, to ‘bear’ meant to ‘carry.’”). 
 174. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2012). (“[T]he right to ‘bear’ . . . is 
unlikely to refer to the home.  To speak of ‘bearing’ arms within one’s home would at all times 
have been an awkward usage.  A right to bear arms thus implies a right to carry a loaded gun outside 
the home.”). 
 175. See id.; Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1152 (“To be sure, the idea of carrying a gun ‘in the clothing 
or in a pocket, for the purpose . . . of being armed and ready,’ does not exactly conjure up images 
of . . . mother concealing a handgun in her coat before stepping outside to retrieve the mail.” 
(omission in original)). 
 176. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 (“Putting all of the [] textual elements together, we find that 
they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”); Moore, 
702 F.3d at 936 (“Confrontations are not limited to the home.”). 
 177. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1152. 
                                                            
258 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 64:235 
mind the image of a woman carrying a handgun to protect herself on her nightly 
jog.178  Therefore, there seems to be no logical reason solely based on the 
language of the Second Amendment to restrict the right of self-defense to the 
home,179 because there is an interest in self-defense outside of the home, as 
well.180 
Third, although the Third Circuit stated that history was inconsistent and 
“do[es] not speak with one voice” on the right to bear arms, its determination 
ignored Heller’s rejection of flawed cases that misinterpreted the Second 
Amendment.181  Rather, history confirms the Second Amendment’s protection 
of the right to bear arms outside of the home.  As shown, during the 
Revolutionary War and the ratification process of the Bill of Rights, the Second 
Amendment protected a right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense inside 
and outside of the home.182  The Framers also understood the same when they 
drafted the Second Amendment.183  Because these historical determinations 
were integral to Heller’s holding, they must be followed in all Second 
Amendment litigation.184 
Moore and Peruta affirm this notion that these historical analyses are central 
to Heller’s holding and, even if the courts disagree with them, they are bound to 
follow the holding.185  In other words, without these historical analyses, Heller 
could not stand on its own.  As the Peruta court noted, “Heller clarifie[d] that 
the keeping and bearing of arms [was], and ha[d] always been, an individual 
right. . . . [T]he right [was], and ha[d] always been, oriented to the end of self-
defense.  Any contrary interpretation of the right, whether propounded in 1791 
or just last week, [was in] error.”186  Thus, the Third Circuit’s reliance on 
 178. See Moore, 702 F.3d at 937 (explaining that it is more likely for a woman to defend herself 
outside of the home than it is for her to need self-defense inside of her home); see also Peruta, 742 
F.3d at 1152 (stating that the right to bear arms “brings to mind scenes such as a woman toting a 
small handgun in her purse as she walks through a dangerous neighborhood, or a night-shift worker 
carrying a handgun in his coat as he travels to and from his job site”). 
 179. Compare Heller, 554 U.S. at 584 (noting that the natural meaning of the language 
indicates carrying a weapon for self-defense), with Moore, 702 F.3d at 936 (“[O]ne doesn’t have to 
be a historian to realize that a right to keep and bear arms for personal self-defense in the eighteenth 
century could not rationally have been limited to the home.”). 
 180. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 446 (3d Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (“[T]he need 
for self-defense naturally exists both outside and inside the home”), cert. denied sub nom. Drake v. 
Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014).  The “object” of self-dense is one’s own person, and this “object” 
is not restricted to, or defined by, its position inside or outside the home. 
 181. Id. at 431 (quoting Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2012), 
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 182. See supra Part I.B–C. 
 183. See HALBROOK, supra note 17, at 310–20 (discussing the Framers’ intent). 
 184. See, e.g., Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The appellees ask us to 
repudiate the Court’s historical analysis. That we can’t do.”). 
 185. See id. at 935 (stating that the court cannot “ignore the implication of the analysis that the 
constitutional right of armed self-defense is broader than the right to have a gun in one’s home”). 
 186. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1155 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). 
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nineteenth century cases, which are contrary to Heller’s holding, as evidence 
that the history of the Second Amendment “do[es] not speak with one voice,” is 
incorrect.187  These cases were rejected by Heller as misinterpreting the Second 
Amendment.188  Therefore, because the Third Circuit declined to perform a full 
historical analysis of the right to bear arms outside of the home, it misunderstood 
the history of the Second Amendment and reached an incorrect conclusion. 
Furthermore, although the Drake court refrained from addressing the Second 
Amendment’s protections outside of the home, its justification for doing so was 
weak.  The court stated that it would await directions from the Supreme Court 
on the issue.189  However, federal circuit courts could easily explore the scope 
of the law.190  Instead, the court wrongly skirted the issue to await the Supreme 
Court’s directions. 
As the Drake court, along with the Second and Fourth Circuits, were correct 
to point out, Heller noted that the Second Amendment was “most acute” inside 
the home.191  Yet, the Third Circuit ignored the implication of this statement in 
its holding. If the Second Amendment’s core protection is “‘most acute’ in the 
home,”192 then it implies that the core protection must also extend beyond the 
home.  There is no need to assume that the Second Amendment may have some 
application outside of the home.193  Based on the above reasons, the implications 
of Heller should have been enough to warrant a full historical analysis of the 
Second Amendment’s protections outside of the home. 
Although Heller did not “clarify” the entire scope of the Second Amendment, 
it provided courts with certain immutable conclusions based on the amendment’s 
text and history.194  The Heller Court concluded that the right was, and always 
had been, at its core, an individual right to self-defense.195  This cannot be 
ignored. 
 187. See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Kachalsky v. Cnty. of 
Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Drake v. Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014). 
 188. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 619–23 (2008). 
 189. Drake, 724 F.3d at 431 (stating that the court will not explain the scope of the Second 
Amendment beyond what the Supreme Court has determined it to mean). 
 190. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to [s]ay what the law is.  Tho[s]e who apply the rule 
to particular ca[s]es, mu[s]t of nece[ss]ity expound and interpret that rule.”). 
 191. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 (“[T]he prohibition [in this case] extends, moreover, to the home, 
where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.”). 
 192. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting McDonald v. City of 
Chi., Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010)). 
 193. Contra Drake, 724 F.3d at 431. 
 194. See Moore, 702 F.3d at 937 (“[W]e are bound by the Supreme Court’s historical analysis 
because it was central to the Court’s holding in Heller.”). 
 195. Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (“There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, 
that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms.”). 
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B.  The Third Circuit Wrongly Allowed a Government Interest in Public Safety 
to Destroy the Second Amendment’s Core Right to Self-Defense 
The core of the Second Amendment is the “inherent right of self-defense” and 
because its core protection is implicated in Drake, legislation that destroyed its 
core protection would not survive under any level of expressed scrutiny.196  By 
applying intermediate scrutiny, the Third Circuit wrongly allowed a government 
interest to destroy the Second Amendment’s core protection.  In New Jersey, the 
only way an individual may carry a handgun for self-defense outside of the home 
is if he can demonstrate a “justifiable need” to carry a firearm.197  New Jersey’s 
requirement for a “justifiable need” hinges entirely on its interest in public 
safety.198   Because a “justifiable need” constitutes something more than self-
defense, New Jersey’s law destroys the core of the Second Amendment’s 
protections.  The individual, seeking to bear arms for the lawful purpose of self-
defense, is left with no way to bear arms.  Therefore, the statute’s requirements 
are unconstitutional. 
In addition, as the Seventh Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and the dissent in Drake 
affirm, the interpretation of the Second Amendment’s right to armed self-
defense is not contingent on casualty data.199  The Supreme Court in Heller 
and McDonald acknowledged and reaffirmed that consideration of public policy  
is removed from judicial deliberation because the Second Amendment itself is a 
policy choice that guarantees a right to bear arms for self-defense.200  As a result, 
when discussing the Second Amendment’s core protection of bearing arms for 
self-defense, certain policy and gun violence arguments shall not be considered. 
C.  The Third Circuit Improperly Concluded that an Early Twentieth Century 
Regulatory Scheme Is the Type of Longstanding and Acceptable Prohibition on 
Second Amendment Rights Heller Envisioned 
Although Heller approved certain longstanding prohibitions against carrying 
guns, these were all well-established before the nineteenth century.201  The Third 
 196. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628, 634–35. 
 197. Drake, 724 F.3d at 428. In addition, by statute, the state has removed the possibility of 
openly “carrying handguns in public . . . without first obtaining a permit, and again conditioned the 
issuance of such permits on a showing of [justifiable] need.”  Id. at 432. 
 198. Id. at 439 (finding that the core of New Jersey’s “‘justifiable need’ standard” is the 
mechanism that “best protect[s] public safety”). 
 199. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 939 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 636) 
(“Anyway the Supreme Court made clear in Heller that it wasn’t going to make the right to bear 
arms depend on casualty counts.”). 
 200. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 636 (“[T]he enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes 
certain policy choices off the table.”); see also McDonald v. City of Chi., Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3045 
(2010). 
 201. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 261 (5th Cir. 2001) (examining Framers-era 
sources and concluding that “felons, infants and those of unsound mind may be prohibited from 
possessing firearms” without running afoul of the Second Amendment); Kates, supra note 38, at 
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Circuit detrimentally relied on Heller’s dicta approval of certain longstanding 
prohibitions on the right to bear arms.202  Yet, the court ignored Heller’s legal 
principle.  The Drake court claimed that a “justifiable need” requirement was 
similar to the longstanding prohibitions approved by Heller.203  However, 
enacted only in 1924, the “justifiable need” restriction does not rest on a 1791 
historical foundation and therefore, it is not a longstanding Heller-approved 
prohibition.204 
As the Drake court stated, Heller was not intended “‘to clarify the entire field’ 
of Second Amendment jurisprudence.”205  The Third Circuit concluded that the 
“justifiable need” requirement to carry a handgun was a “longstanding” 
prohibition acknowledged by Heller.206  However, the “longstanding 
prohibitions” the Heller Court enumerated were: 
[T]he possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws 
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools 
and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.207 
Although this was not a comprehensive list, the prohibitions listed concern the 
outright prohibition on the use, possession, and purchase of firearms in certain 
locations and by people with certain character, behavioral, psychological, or 
psychiatric dispositions.208 
These presumptively valid longstanding prohibitions are not substantially the 
same as a “justifiable need” to carry a handgun in public.209  In fact, unlike the 
“longstanding prohibitions” mentioned in Heller, the so-called “longstanding” 
regulation in Drake was not a prohibition against a certain class of persons or 
prohibition from carrying in protected areas.210  Instead, this “longstanding 
prohibition” is not a prohibition at all—it is a predicative and demonstrative 
266 (stating that the eighteenth century view that “[f]elons simply did not fall within the benefits 
of the common law right to possess arms”). 
 202. Drake, 724 F.3d at 431–22. 
 203. Id. at 432; see Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (“[T]here will be time enough to expound upon the 
historical justifications for the exceptions we have mentioned if and when those exceptions come 
before us.”). 
 204. Drake, 724 F.3d at 432. 
 205. Id. at 430–31 (quoting Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012), 
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013)). 
 206. Id. at 431–32. 
 207. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
 208. See id. at 626–27 & n.26. 
 209. See Amy Hetzner, Where Angels Tread: Gun-Free School Zone Laws and an Individual 
Right to Bear Arms, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 359, 382 n.165 (2011) (stating that there are presumptively 
valid longstanding prohibitions around sensitive areas such as schools); see also Adam Winkler, 
Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1577 (2009)) (“In short, the meaning of the Second 
Amendment has changed a lot, but its impact on gun control has not.”). 
 210. Drake, 724 F.3d at 428–29 (describing a statutory scheme that emphasized all persons 
and places). 
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legal requirement to exercise the fundamental right of the Second Amendment.  
The regulation declared that one must demonstrate that he satisfies the need-
based qualification, that is, the person must show that he has a “justifiable need” 
for self-defense.211  This determination by Drake is at odds with Heller’s 
conclusion that every American citizen has the right to bear arms for self-defense 
under the Second Amendment.212 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The text, history, and Supreme Court jurisprudence of the Second 
Amendment reveal that the Third Circuit, in Drake v. Filko, was incorrect by 
holding that New Jersey’s “justifiable need” requirement does not burden the 
core of the Second Amendment’s protection of the right to bear arms.  Although 
the Supreme Court has yet to determine the “vast terra incognita” of the Second 
Amendment’s extra domum scope, the federal district and circuit courts are not 
restricted from exploring the unknown.  Rather, the history of the Second 
Amendment—its English and Constitutional origins—indicate that the Second 
Amendment has a general application to bearing arms both inside and outside 
the home.  The Second Amendment’s rights’ core is related to, and dependent 
on, an individual’s inherent and natural right to self-defense. 
It is most consistent, with both the historical analysis of the Second 
Amendment and Heller’s holding, for the courts to conclude that the Second 
Amendment protects a right to bear arms outside of the home for the purpose of 
self-defense. Consequently, the courts should strike down a “justifiable need,” 
“good cause,” “proper cause,” or “good and substantial reason” to carry in public 
unless these requirements are equivocal to the Second Amendment’s core 
protection of self-defense.  Otherwise, the Second Amendment’s core protection 
is destroyed.  Furthermore, courts should not address public policy choices 
limiting the Second Amendment’s core right to bear arms, because the Second 
Amendment preserves the public policy decision made at its ratification, and 
only Congress is tasked with altering that decision. 
The Drake dissent, Moore and Peruta majorities, and Heller are the most 
appropriate approaches to Second Amendment issues today.  As shown, these 
approaches are consistent with the text of the Second Amendment, its history, 
and its meaning as described by the Supreme Court.  Drake’s conclusion 
demonstrates a desire of the federal circuit courts to skirt the Second 
Amendment’s scope, to ignore history, and to fabricate an erroneous solution 
that infringes on a legitimate, constitutionally protected right to bear arms for 
self-defense.  
 
 211. See id. (discussing the application of New Jersey’s “justifiable need” permit requirement). 
 212. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592, 595. 
                                                            
